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Risk, Institutions and Growth: Why England and Not China? 
 
We analyze the role of risk-sharing institutions in transitions to modern economies. 
Transitions requires individual-level risk-taking in pursuing productivity-enhancing activities 
including using and developing new knowledge. Individual-level, idiosyncratic risk implies that 
distinct risk-sharing institutions – even those providing the same level of insurance – can lead 
to different growth trajectories if they differently motivate risk-taking. Historically, risk sharing 
institutions were selected based on their cultural and institutional compatibility and not their 
unforeseen growth implications. We simulate our growth model incorporating England’s and 
China’s distinct pre-modern risk-sharing institutions. The model predicts a transition in 
England and not China even with equal levels of risk sharing. Under the clan-based Chinese 
institution, the relatively risk-averse elders had more control over technological choices 
implying lower risk-taking. Focusing on non-market institutions expands on previous growth-
theoretic models to highlight that transitions can transpire even in the absence of exogenous 
productivity shocks or time-dependent state variables. Recognizing the role of non-market 
institutions in the growth process bridges the view that transitions are due to luck and the 
view that transitions are inevitable. Transitions transpire when ‘luck’ creates the conditions 
under which economic agents find it beneficial to make the choices leading to positive rates 
of technological change. Luck came in the form of historical processes leading to risk-sharing 
institutions whose unintended consequences encouraged productivity-enhancing risk-taking.  
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 “Theories of economic growth have failed. These theories are built around a
positive rate of technological change, either simply assumed or generated ... by
... assumption.”
Robert E. Lucas Jr., 2002, p.110.
“Variations in the economic performance across countries (e.g, earlier indus-
trialization in England than in China) reﬂect initial diﬀerences in geographical
factors and historical accidents and their manifestations in variations in insti-
tutional, demographic and cultural factors...”
Oded Galor, 2005, Ch. 4.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
What has led to transitions from pre-modern economies to modern economies? Growth-
theoretic models identify two important causes of transition from pre-modern economies
to modern ones. In multiple-equilibria growth models, a low-growth economy is a stable
equilibrium because decreasing relative risk aversion implies that agents are too risk-averse
to choose the modern, high-risk, high-return technology. A transition to a high-growth
economy requires exogenous “accidents and good fortune” that disables the low-growth
equilibrium (Becker et al., 1990, p. 14) . In ‘endogenous transition’ models, by contrast,
low-growth equilibria are unstable and a “transition from stagnation to growth is largely
an inevitable outcome of the process of development” (Galor, 2007, p. 472). In particular,
time-dependent changes in relative prices, technology, or wealth trigger a transition.1
Both the multiple equilibria and the endogenous transition models have been criti-
cized for failing to explain transitions. Multiple-equilibria models invoke accidents (Galor
2005, pp. 176-7) while endogenous transition models "are built around a positive rate
of technological change, either simply assumed or generated as an equilibrium outcome
by the assumption of [for example] constant or increasing returns to the accumulation of
knowledge" (Lucas, 2002, p. 110).
This paper theoretically analyzes and historically evaluates endogenous transitions in
the absence of accidental changes in wealth or productivity, time-dependent variables,
eﬃcient markets, or knowledge of modern technologies. It focuses on how risk-sharing
1See the review in Galor (2005). For some important contributions to both lines of research, see Kremer
(1993), Jones (2001), Galor and Weil (2000), Hansen and Prescott (2002), Gollin, Parente and Rogerson
(2002) and Galor (2005).
1institutions as well as their forms and functions inﬂuence individual-level incentives to
engage in risky, productivity-enhancing activities. Productivity enhancements require
cultivators, producers, and traders to conduct risky experiments.2 Yet, low levels of
wealth and decreasing relative risk aversion imply that individual-level risk taking, while
socially beneﬁcial, is not likely to be individually rational prior to a transition. Risk-
sharing institutions that make risk-taking individually rational can increase productivity
and lead to a transition.3 Whether a transition transpires directly depends only on the
choice of institutions at the social level and choices about risk-taking at the individual
level.
We model this argument using an OLG ‘technology transition’ model in which eco-
nomic agents choose how to employ their capital.4 An agent’s choice determines the
probability of higher future capital productivity. This higher productivity is due to a
complex process of the creation of new productivity-enhancing knowledge from which we
abstract away. Choosing the ‘traditional’ technology is less likely to generate new knowl-
edge but is also less risky. Experimenting is more risky but is more likely to generate new
knowledge. This knowledge increases the capital productivity of the agent who discovers
it and, once this knowledge spreads, it increases capital productivity more generally. A
pre-modern economy is one in which most agents choose the ‘traditional’ technology and
the rate of productivity growth is correspondingly low. A modern economy is one where all
agents experiment and choose the ‘risky’ technology leading to a high rate of productivity
growth. In a transition, the number of agents choosing the risky technology increases over
time causing an increase in the rate of productivity growth.
Positive externalities imply that agents will employ less capital than socially optimal
in the risky technology. Decreasing relative risk aversion implies that poor agents select
the traditional technology. If suﬃciently many agents are poor, a transition will therefore
not transpire and the economy stagnates. A risk-sharing institution can mitigate the
impact of low wealth and risk aversion on some agent’s technological choices and initiate
an endogenous transition. More speciﬁcally, a risk-sharing institution that suﬃciently
increases risk-taking causes a transition. For reasons discussed below, two institutions
that provide the same risk-sharing, can nevertheless have diﬀerent risk-taking implications.
2Such risky experimentation was particularly important in the past because the epistemological basis of
technology was narrow (Mokyr, 2002). The ability to predict was lower because causal relations were
not well understood. Along these lines, Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) examine the relations between the
indivisibility of risky projects, diversiﬁcation, and growth.
3There was, of course, some risk-taking in all pre-modern economies. Some risky activities such as warfare
and exploration were taken by those who could pay others to bear the personal cost of failure. Necessity
and various means to mitigate risk (particularly in commerce) motivated others to pursue risky ventures.
Our model allows – and simulations reveal – some risk taking prior to the transition.
4Analytically, we focus, without loss of generality, on capital productivity rather than human capital to
capture choices with positive externalities (e.g., cultivation techniques).
2Risk-sharing institutions – in particular, their eﬀectiveness and forms – can determine
if and when a transition to a modern economy transpires.
This causal relation between risk, non-market institutions, and transitions is intu-
itively appealing. It captures the limited growth potential of relying on ‘traditional’ ways
of pursuing economic activities. Following the beaten path is safe, but unlikely to lead
to new destinations. Risking to travel oﬀ the beaten path is more likely to lead to new
productivity-enhancing insights or innovations. To keep our model parsimonious, how-
ever, we don’t attempt to formally capture this complex process. Instead, agents choose
between technologies with diﬀerent productivity shocks. Yet, a reasonable interpretation
of this formulation is that choosing a high-risk technology amounts to generating new
technological and organizational knowledge.5
We evaluate the historical relevance of transitions’ institutional conditionality by mod-
eling China’s and England’s pre-modern institutions, simulate their implications and qual-
itatively evaluate their time-series and cross-section implications.
In both economies, concern with the social order and compassion led to eﬀective, yet
distinct, risk-sharing institutions. In China, poor relief was predominantly provided by
lineages (clans) headed by their elders. In England, beginning in the 16th century, the state
gradually displaced the Church and voluntary associations as the main provider of poor
relief. The Old Poor Law of 1601 formalized this system which, with some modiﬁcations,
prevailed until 1834.6 Similar transitions transpired elsewhere in Europe but England’s
system was particularly eﬀective (Solar, 1995).
In China and England, the forms that these institutions took were not selected by their
(unforeseen) growth implications. Their institutional forms were selected by the state
based on their compatibility with the prevailing culture and institutions.7 A clan-based
risk-sharing institution indeed evolved in the collectivist, lineage-based Chinese society
while a state-based risk-sharing institution evolved in the individualistic, nuclear-family
based English society. It is therefore appropriate to consider these risk-sharing institutions
as exogenous in examining their growth implications.8
The evolution of diﬀerent risk-sharing institutions highlights an interpretation of our
analysis as bridging the view that transitions are due to luck and the view that transitions
are inevitable. Transitions transpire when ‘luck’ creates the conditions under which eco-
5Similarly gratifying is the observation that transition does not depend on incentives provided by eﬃcient
markets. An integral part of a transition is the development of the knowledge required for improving
markets.
6Voigtländer and Voth (2006) found that the Old Poor Law did not inﬂuence England’s industrialization
by increasing wages.
7For one perspective on why institutional dynamics are a historical process in which past cultural and
institutional elements inﬂuence subsequent institutions, see Greif (1994, 2006, chapter 7).
8Institutions governing one transaction (i.e., poor relief and social order) tend to have unintended conse-
quences on behavior in other transactions, i.e., risk-taking (Greif, 2006).
3nomic agents ﬁnd it beneﬁcial to make the choices leading to a positive rate of technological
change.9 Luck did not come in the form of a random draw of knowledge or wealth but
in the form of historical processes leading to risk-sharing institutions whose unintended
consequences encouraged productivity-enhancing risk-taking. Transitions were conditional
on having risk-sharing institutions that increased the rate of productivity growth.10
Our simulations and historical analyses conﬁrm the importance of risk-sharing institu-
tions in transitions to a modern economy. China’s lineage-based institution implied more
risk-sharing prior to the introduction of the Old Poor Law. Yet, it was relatively inef-
fective in promoting risk-taking because lineages’ elders had, by law and custom, strong
inﬂuence on technological choices made by their lineages’ young members. Because older
people tend to be more risk averse than younger ones, the lineage-based institution led
to less risk taking than if the young were in charge.11 Our simulations reveal that if the
Chinese and the English institutions supplied the same level of risk-sharing, an eleven
percent initial diﬀerence between the risk aversion of the young and the old was suﬃcient
to prevent China from embarking on a transition to a modern economy. To initiate a
transition, the Chinese institutions would have had to provide, roughly speaking, about
twice the risk sharing of the English ones.12 This ﬁnding highlights the impact of culture
on institutional forms (e.g. how risk-sharing is provided) and that institutional forms
inﬂuence outcomes (e.g., risk-taking) beyond their impact of institutional functions (e.g.,
l e v e lo fr i s k - s h a r i n g ) . 13
This analysis demonstrates the historical relevance of the causal relations between risk-
sharing institutions, knowledge, and transitions. It is also reassuring to note the empirical
conﬁrmation of the model’s qualitative time-series and cross-section predictions. Our
9Previous works in economic history have focused on an endowment windfall due to discoveries (e.g., Pomer-
anz 2000), better informal contract enforcement institutions and the enlightenment (Mokyr 2005, 2006),
and higher mortality rates which increases per-capita incomes (Voigtländer and Voth 2006).
10On the role of risk taking in economic growth, see, for example Hausmann and Rodrik 2003; Iyigun and
Rodrik 2005.
11Contemporary empirical analyses found that the elders are more risk averse. Einav and Cohen (2007)
found that risk aversion declines after the age of 18 and increases after the age of 48. See also Graham,
Harvey, and Puri (2008); Halek and Eisenhauer (2001); Riley and Chow (1992). Early twentieth-century
decisions by Chinese peasants regarding crops and labor were inﬂuenced by risk aversion (Wiens, 1976),
while in the modern economy, low risk-aversion fosters entrepreneurship (van Praag and Cramer, 2001).
That noted, it is possible that the link between age and risk aversion is spurious, and more of a man-
ifestation of changes in risk aversion driven by diﬀerences in the consumption patterns and habits of the
old versus the young. We are agnostic on this point, because our model does not ride on the assumption
that older people are simply more risk averse. As we shall elaborate further below, we can accomodate
preferences such that individuals become more risk averse in old age not because they are old but, for
instance, due to their higher consumption habits.
12Risk sharing is here measured as the reduction – compared to the individualistic economy – in the
standard deviation of innovations to the process of productivity. Consult the model section for details.
13On the relations between culture and institutions, see, for example, Greif (1994, 2006); Lal (1998); Zak and
Knack (2001); Acemoglu et. al. (2001); Rodrik, et. al. (2004); Helpman (2004); North (2005); Tabellini
(2005); Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2006).
4analysis accounts for observations that are diﬃcult to reconcile when viewing transitions as
either accidental or inevitable. Among these are the surge in China’s contributions to new
knowledge under the Song Dynasty (960-1279 CE), their subsequent decline, England’s
leadership in innovations rather than inventions during the Industrial Revolution, and the
capacity of European states to rapidly imitate England. Our analysis reveals that risk-
sharing institutions may have been important in rendering England, rather than China,
the ﬁrst modern economy.
Our theoretical analysis assumes that China and England diﬀered only by their risk-
sharing institutions. Historically, however, these two societies diﬀered in many ways. Some
of these distinctions, such as diﬀerences in cultural attitudes toward risks and inventions
(e.g., Mokyr, 2002, 2006) and the institutional foundations of the market (Greif, 2005)
might be endogenous to the institutional distinctions we focus on. Other distinctions
such as political institutions or access to natural resources (Pomeranz 2000) were not.
The possible importance of such distinctions notwithstanding, it is important to note
that China was economically ahead, or not far behind, England prior to the 16th or 17th
century. Urbanization rates suggest that around 1000 CE, China was more economically
developed than Europe. Grain-equivalent wages in China, for example, were 87% of the
English in 1550-1649 (Broadberry and Gupta, 2006) and only during the 19th century
were European markets better integrated than those in China (Shiue and Keller, 2007).
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a historical background on
risk-sharing institutions and elders’ authority in England and China. Section 3 describes
the model. Section 4 provides the numerical results of our model. Section 5 lays out
supporting historical observations, and section 6 concludes.
2 Social Structures, Risk-Sharing Institutions and Knowl-
edge
Over the last millennium, institutions insuring against idiosyncratic individual-level risks
evolved diﬀerently in China and England. Three observations about these non-market
institutions are presented in this section. First, lineages, dominated by their elders, pre-
vailed in pre-modern China, but not England. More economic choices involving risk-taking
were made by elders. Second, after 1601 CE, the main risk-sharing institutions in these
countries were state-based in England and lineage-based in China. Third, risk-sharing
institutions inﬂuenced risk-taking and hence the creation of new productivity-enhancing
knowledge. These observations underpin the assumptions we later make in modeling these
risk-sharing institutions.
52.1 Social Structures
By 1000 CE, social structures in England and China had already diﬀered. In England,
generally speaking, there were no large, kin-based social structures such as lineages and
tribes. The nuclear family structure predominated. In China, however, lineages (clans)
have been important economic, social and cultural units up to the modern period.
The elimination of large, kin-based social structures in Europe was due to the dogma
adopted by the Church regarding marriage, although even the secular law reﬂected fea-
tures that presumably limited optimal family size (Goody 1983; Ekelund et al., 1996;
Greif 2006). The Roman Catholic Church dogma discouraged practices that enlarged the
family, such as adoption, polygamy, concubinage, divorce, and remarriage. The Church
also restricted marriages among the kin (consanguineous marriages), often up to the sev-
enth degree, and prohibited unions without the bride’s explicit consent.14 Kin marriages
and parents’ ability to retain kinship ties through arranged marriages were historically
important means of maintaining kinship groups. But, as Goody (1983) ﬁrst observed and
Ekelund et al. (1996, p. 93, 94) later stated, “land acquisition and estate building through
consanguineous marriages became increasingly common in the Middle Ages... [t]he Church
hoped that by further restricting marital options, the incidence of heirs would decrease,
thereby increasing the likelihood of inheritance for itself.” Moreover, even European secu-
lar laws worked to limit family size: “While secular law did not prohibit endogamy, it did
regulate the ability of children from such marriages to inherit an estate.”
The European family structures did not evolve monotonically toward the nuclear fam-
ily, nor was their evolution geographically and socially uniform. Yet, by the late medieval
period, the nuclear family became the norm in Western Europe (e.g., Mitterauer et. al.,
1982; Goody, 1983; Ekelund et. al., 1996; Herlihy, 1985; Greif, 2006, chapter 8). The
(Germanic) Salic law of the sixth century denied legal rights to anyone not aﬃliated with
a large kinship group. By the eighth century, the term ‘family’ among the Germanic tribes
denoted one’s immediate family. Tribes and lineages, by and large, were no longer insti-
tutionally relevant (Guichard and Cuvillier, 1996). By the 10th century, the English King
issued a law mandating every male to join a group that would guarantee his appearance
in court, suggesting that kinship groups could no longer be held accountable as was the
case when the Salic law was speciﬁed.
Quantitative evidence from later centuries also reveals a decline of large kinship groups.
English court rolls from the thirteenth century reﬂect that cousins were not more likely
than non-kin to be in each other’s presence (Razi, 1993). The English poll-tax records
14In the late Roman period, the law prohibited marriage among relatives to the 3rd degree, implying that
ﬁrst cousins could marry. The Roman law also required consent to these marriages. Herlihy (1985), pp.
7-8.
6of 1377 indicate that there were approximately 2.3 individuals over the age of thirteen
per-household (Schoﬁeld, 2003, p. 83). The mean household size in ﬁve English parishes
in the 16th century ranged from 4.05 to 6.05 and that of 100 parishes from the 16th to
the 19th century was 4.79. Only about 10 percent of the households had a resident kin
(Laslett, 1969, pp. 204, 207, 218).15 Large kinship groups remained important only among
nobility and on the fringes of Europe (e.g., Scotland).
The nuclear family was also a basic unit of social organization in pre-modern China.
But larger, kin-based social structures were common and remained culturally, socially, po-
litically and economically prominent well into the modern period.16 Indeed, the ideology
and practice of patrilineal descent, ﬁlial pity, and ancestor worship was the hallmark of
Chinese society and culture (e.g., Freedman, 1958). Furthermore, social and economic
relations were commonly kinship-based and lineages provided members with local public
goods such as protection and education (e.g., Hamilton, 1990). The state, whose magis-
trates were positioned at the county level and above, used kin-based organizations for tax
collection and considered male descendants of a household a jointly liable tax unit.
The structure of Chinese kin-based social structures evolved over time and was not
uniform across diﬀerent regions. In particular, there was a gradual shift from communal
families to lineage organizations. The communal family are the kinship group referred
to the most during the Tang (618-690 CE, 705-907 CE) and the Song (960-1279 CE)
dynasties. These were domestic units that had not divided – in terms of property or
membership – for ﬁve, six, or even ten generations. Some communal families included
hundreds and even thousands of members. The state praised communal families as an ideal
form of organization and supported exceptional ones through tax exemptions. Communal
families are still often reﬂected in the historical records of later dynasties but we have
no quantitative measure of how many communal families existed at any point in time.
Given the complexity of supporting, organizing and maintaining the coherence of such
large groups, really large communal families must have been relatively rare and it seems
that they gradually vanished.17
After the Song dynasty (960-1279 CE), lineage organizations became common. These
looser associations of relatively large numbers of kin “were the predominant form of kinship
organizations in late imperial China” (Ebrey and Watson, 1986, pp. 1, 6; Watson 1982).
Detailed information on the share of the population with lineage aﬃliation is not available
15The mean household size of those receiving poor relief in Strasbourg in 1523 was similar (Jutte, 1996, p.
382).
16This discussion particularly draws on Smith (1987); Ebrey and Watson (1986); Szonyi (2002); Freedman
(1958); Watson (1982); Liu (1959).
17By tracing clans’ life-cycle, Fei and Liu (1982, p. 399) concluded that the critical maximum size (CMV)
of a lineage is about 1,400 males and females which is about 300 families. Abramitzky (2008) presents an
empirical analysis of contractual problems in large, risk-sharing organizations.
7but lineages were common in southern China, less common at the center and least common
in northern China.
In addition, those with suﬃcient means often maintained large households, either in
the form of a ‘stem’ or an extended family. A stem family included parents and at least
one married son and his family and averaged ten people (Fei and Liu 1982). The extended
family encompassed members of several families related through the male line. Members
often lived in a family compound, had common property and an internal dispute-resolution
mechanism. Such larger households were culturally esteemed and economically beneﬁcial
to their members, practically because they consolidated assets and local political power
under family control.
In all these social structures, fathers, and elders more generally, exerted various degrees
of authority even over their adult children and control over family assets. In Imperial
China, “the father had paternal authority over his children, while the children had the
duty to practice ﬁlial behavior and to support their parents in old age. The family head
had absolute authority and discretion. This kind of power was not only conﬁrmed by
the rule of propriety (li) ... but was also protected by state and customary law. These
rules provided him with arbitrary power over family property ... [and] in making decisions
concerning all aspects of family matters... all earning of family members had to be handed
to him.... Even members who settled somewhere else or were temporarily absent, sent their
surplus earnings to him” (Chen 1999, pp. 250-1).
In China, the preferences of the elders had a large and institutionalized inﬂuence on
the economic actions by young adults. In sharp contrast, adult sons were not under their
fathers’ authority under English law and customs, long before the 17th century.
2.2 Risk-sharing Institutions
Throughout history, risk-sharing non-market institutions have been created to maintain
social order and help those in need.18 These details – institutional forms – were en-
dogenous to these societies’ pre-existing cultural and institutional elements. In particular,
the absence and presence of large kinship groups determined the cost to the rulers of es-
tablishing diﬀerent risk-sharing institutions. In England, risk-sharing institutions based
on large kin groups were a costly proposition given the absence of such groups. This was
not the case in China. Indeed, the English (and more broadly, the European) institutions
were not kin-based while in China they were.
Speciﬁcally, in Europe prior to the 16th century, secular and religious organizations
– monasteries, fraternities, mutual-insurance guilds, and communes – assisted the poor
or their members in times of need. They provided individuals with such services as poor
18We shall elaborate more on this point in subsection 3.2.4 below.
8relief and unemployment and disability assistance. In the late medieval period, the total
capacity of England’s monasteries for grain storage was more than what was required
to sustain the Kingdom’s population for a year (Fenoaltea, 1976). In the early 16th
century, the majority of the commoners in England belonged to fraternities and guilds
that provided social safety nets (Richardson, 2005). The same pattern seems to have
prevailed elsewhere in Europe (Reynolds, 1984; Brenner, 1987). Getting relief from these
risk-sharing institutions was, however, uncertain as they were either voluntarily provided
by charity organizations (e.g., by the Church) or cooperatively ﬁnanced by working people
without much wealth.
This system of poor relief came under pressure due to increasing population and urban-
ization during the 16th century and alternatives were sought through legislation and other
public initiatives. The Wars of Religion contributed to its decline as many of the corpo-
rations through which insurance was providedw e r ea s s o c i a t e dw i t ht h eC a t h o l i cC h u r c h
and Protestant rulers dismantled them. During the Counter-Reformation, Catholic rulers
also conﬁscated the properties of these corporations to ﬁnance their wars against the
Protestants. Europe lost its system of poor relief. In England, Henry VIII established the
Anglican Church, dissolved the monasteries in 1536-40, and shut down all religious guilds,
fraternities, almshouses, and hospitals in 1545-49. These actions "destroyed much of the
institutional fabric which had provided charity for the poor in the past" (Slack, 1990, p.
8).
Social order was undermined by the lack of an eﬀective poor relief system and popu-
lation growth pressured wages and increased poverty. States responded by creating alter-
native, state-based systems during the 16th century. Local administrative bodies within
the European states, such as parishes and cities, were required by law to care for their
poor. In England, the Poor Law Act of 1601 (the Old Poor Law) formalized the emerging
alternative system which lasted, with some modiﬁcations, until 1834. Each parish was
authorized and obliged to levy a property tax to care for the poor (Boyer, 1990).
Shifting the responsibility for poor relief to the state (via local administrators) was
a European phenomenon and poor relief systems similar to England’s were established
elsewhere (Geremek, 1997; Jutte, 1996; de Vries and de Woude, 1997, pp. 654-664). Yet,
the English Poor Law system was more reliable and generous than the continental ones.
In England, expenses were ﬁnanced through a variable poor rate on the assessed rental
value of local real estate property and most aid was given without forcing the recipient
to move to the poor house.19 Continental poor relief, by contrast, was ﬁnanced from a
variety of sources: voluntary donations, capital income, subsidies from local and national
19Those who ﬁnanced the Poor Law had no legal rights to inﬂuence risk taking. Moreover, farmers who
took risk (by specializing in grains) had the political power to transfer the cost of insurance on to others
(Boyer, 1986).
9governments, and general tax revenues. Funding was, therefore, less reliable. Furthermore,
the legal right to relief was well deﬁned in England while rights were vaguely deﬁned, less
credibly assured, and generally at the discretion of local authorities on the continent.
Annual spending on poor relief in England was about 1 percent of national income
in the 17th century and about 2.5 percent at its peak during the 19th. At that time, it
supported about 11 percent of the population and may have boosted average income of
the bottom 40 percent by 14 to 25 percent. Expenditure per capita was 7.5 times higher
than in France in the 1780s, 2.5 times higher than in the Netherlands in the 1820s, and
5 times higher than in Belgium in the 1820s. (Boyer, 1990; Mokyr, 2002).20 England’s
exceptionalism reﬂects distinct needs in the late 16th century when these systems were
created. While peasantry and other ‘customary’ labor relations that insured the poor still
dominated in other European states, the transition to wage laborer had already begun in
England.21
Indeed, the evidence reveals that the poor were better secured after the implementation
of the Poor Law in the 1620s. The elasticity of mortality with respect to real wages was
negative and statistically signiﬁcant from 1540 to 1640 but it was basically zero from 1640
to 1740.22 The break-point in the trend occurred in 1625 and was due to better poor relief,
and not higher real wages, reduced variance of grain output, increased urbanization, or
changing climate (Kelly and Ógrada 2008). The death rate actually declined in England
during the ﬁrst half of the eighteenth century (Razzell 1994), while in China it was stable
(Lee and Feng 1999). The relative importance of better nutrition and change in mortality
during this period is still debated, but the evidence indicates that nutrition “should be
regarded as one in a battery of factors, often interacting, which played a key rule in
Britain’s mortality transition” (Harris, 2004, p. 380).23
Imperial China also experienced great diversity and changes in its poor relief institu-
tions.24 The state sporadically ﬁnanced general or medical aid to the old, poor, sick, and
disabled. Buddhist monasteries and temples provided medical service, fed the hungry and
sheltered the aged and decrepit. Their support, however, was uncertain as they fed any
poor including ‘undeserving’ ones. Benevolent societies were established after 1580, par-
20An extensive network of private charity suggests the limits of public relief but it contributed to social order
despite the economic transition.
21On these and other aspects of the system see, for example, Boyer (1986); Slack (1990); Solar (1995).
Patriquin (2006) compares the English case with that of Scotland and Ireland.
22Nicolini (2007); information from Parish’s registers is available from 1540. See Landers (1987) about
London.
23The role of better nutrition in this decline has been particularly emphasized by McKeown and his co-author
and surveyed in Harris (2004). Smith (2008) emphasized the positive role of the Poor Law in reducing risk
of labor migration.
24This discussion particularly draws on Smith (1987); Ebrey and Watson (1986); Szonyi (2002); Freed-
man (1958). We are not familiar with any quantitative analysis of these kinship organizations’ relative
importance.
10ticularly by members of the mercantile elite and the gentry. Yet, their forms and functions
were often rigid and did not adjust to various needs.
In China, the major source of aid to the poor, the sick, and the aged were kinship
groups. The role of communal and extended families in providing insurance is transparent
from their internal organization. In such families, all property was held in common and
the “underlying principle was distribution of income to all members equally according to
need, just as though they were members of a small family” (Ebrey and Watson, 1986, p.
33). The young provided labor while the elders controlled all assets and had the legal and
customary rights to make communal decisions.
In many respects, the lineages were the functional successors of communal families.
They similarly exerted considerable legal and customary control over their members, pro-
vided them with public goods such as education, held common property, and acted as
social and political units. In pre-modern China, a lineage “performs many functions re-
lated to education, ceremony, social security, and maintenance of law and order. Whereas
now most of these functions are performed by the government, the clan was a primary
social group (or organization) through which these functions were carried out before the
art of government was perfected” (Fei and Liu, 1982, p. 375).
After the eleventh century, lineages were the most common and reliable source of poor
relief. The ﬁrst lineage charitable estate was established by Fan Chung-yen (989-1052 CE).
Such estates were considered by the state and their members as the lineage’s property.
Yet, they were not commonly owned corporations but were controlled and managed by the
elders of the lineage’s prominent families. Income was used to ﬁnance lineage rituals and
provide members with education, income, and support for weddings, burials and illness.
Members in poverty received additional beneﬁts such as free lodging. The state motivated
lineages to care for its poor by considering it legally responsible for crimes committed by
its members.
2.3 Risk Taking and Knowledge
Risk-sharing institutions might theoretically foster risk taking, knowledge, and produc-
tivity. Indeed, increases in useful, productivity-enhancing knowledge characterized the
productivity growth leading to the modern economy (Mokyr, 1990, 2002). The putting-
out system, turnpike trusts, drainage projects, the factory system, the steam engine, the
New Husbandry, and the joint stock companies directly increased production and/or pro-
ductivity. Behind these changes was new knowledge of, or the correct belief in, their
beneﬁts. Gaining this new, productivity-increasing knowledge, however, is risky. It is
risky for an individual to invest in discovering new productivity-enhancing (technological,
organizational, or commercial) knowledge. Implementing existing knowledge often implies
11risk as well (e.g., long-distance trade). Yet, a familiar risk is subjectively less intimidating
than an unfamiliar one.
We often consider the patent system as the main means to induce risky investment
in discovering new useful knowledge. Yet, patent systems were rare and ineﬀective in
pre-modern economies. Even in England, an acceleration in patenting began only by
1757 (Sullivan, 1989) while the transition to modern growth began in the seventeenth
century (Clark, 2005). By and large, the new knowledge that increased productivity in
pre-modern economies reﬂected the input of many individuals who took personal risks
in ‘deviating’ from the conventional ways of ‘doing things’ and discovered productivity-
enhancing knowledge. Pursuit of risky innovations and inventions contributed to the
knowledge base that others acquired through observation, imitation, and education.
The high personal risk associated with developing new knowledge during the English
transition is suggested by the evidence on inheritances. The inheritances left by English
entrepreneurs (from 1700 to 1850) are “consistent with the intuitively appealing hypothesis
that entrepreneurs in the modern sector suﬀered a higher failure rate, but when they struck
it big, they did so on a larger scale” (Mokyr, 2006, p. 31). The risk was suﬃciently high
that even wealthy individuals sometime lost all their property and ended relying on poor
relief. One wealthy individual who took risks and paid dearly was “William Radcliﬀe,
a Derbyshire ‘improver of cotton machinery,’ who bought Samuel Oldknow’s mill after
the latter’s bankruptcy, and apparently died poor after a roller-coaster career; another
was Samuel Hall, a cotton-spinner and engineer who died in ‘very reduced circumstances.’
The cotton merchant Thomas Walker had to live his ﬁnal years from a bequest. Perhaps
the most spectacular example of a failed entrepreneur was the highly eccentric Archibald
Cochrane, earl of Dundonald, who spent his family’s fortune on his ill-fated chemical
business. More than anything, however, Cochrane was unlucky. Somewhat comparable
was the case of Henry Fourdrinier, a well to-do London stationer who gambled on the
main innovation in paper-making of his age, spent £60,000 on the business and failed in
1810. Both Cochrane and Fourdrinier are thus examples of a signiﬁcant negative private
return on entrepreneurship” (Mokyr, 2006, pp. 24-5, Mokyr, 2010).
Given the personal risk of pursuing new, productivity-enhancing activities, it is rea-
sonable that risk-sharing institutions mattered. Risk-sharing institutions can encourage
risk-taking by individuals without the wealth required for self-insurance. Indeed, the num-
ber of individuals of modest means that took the risk of creating new knowledge during
one of the most important part of the transition, the Industrial Revolution, was far from
negligible. There were 333 ‘great inventors’ who were active after 1790 and were born
prior to 1845 in Britain and the USA (that also had a Poor Law system).25 Some 38
25A ‘great inventor’ is an individual who was included in biographical dictionaries because of his or her
12percent of these great inventors were of modest means.26 More generally, the poor, as the
largest group in England, made economic decisions involving risk that, taken as a whole,
mattered. Economic agents who were not wealthy had to decide, for example, whether to
work in seasonal occupations, whether to adopt new agricultural methods, to transition
to wage labor or to specialize.
Finally, as our model shall illustrate below, risk-sharing institutions increase the ex-
pected return to the wealthy from investing in the creation of new knowledge and taking
out productivity enhancing activities by reducing the likelihood of violent responses from
those economically disadvantaged by the process of change. The cost to the wealthy of
risk-taking activities leading to new technological, organizational and commercial methods
decline when those with meager means are protected from the implied economic change.
Indeed, despite the major transformation that England experienced during its transition,
it was surprisingly peaceful.27 A Poor Law that supported between 5 to 15 percent of
the population at any time (Solar, 1995, p. 8) probably contributed a great deal to a
relatively peaceful economic transition. "While there was some resistance to enclosure,
the English were, by continental or Irish standards, quite easily separated from the land
in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries" (Solar, 1995, p. 9). Similarly, there was rel-
atively little popular resistance to other major transformations such as the decline in the
putting-out system, the introduction of hourly wage or the New Husbandry. England was
remarkably peaceful during a transition that destroyed numerous traditional occupations
and shifted risk toward the poor by increasing wage labor and eliminating many of their
small landholdings and communal rights.
Between 210 BCE and 1900 CE, there were as many as 225,887 recorded armed re-
bellions in China (Deng 2000, p. 7) and famines led to food riots (Li 1982, Wong 1982).
A 17th century Chinese scholar and administrator explains: “The reason that peace does
not prevail among the people is because of diﬀerences in wealth. The poor are often
not capable of supporting themselves, and yet the rich are continually fearful of others’
demands upon them, and tend to be tightﬁsted. It is this which gives rise to the men-
tality of conﬂict. Confucius once observed that it is not poverty itself which leads to the
contributions to technological progress.
26This, judging by the fact that their fathers were farmers, low-skilled workers, or were neither members
of the elite nor had a declared occupation. Calculated from Khan (2008), Table 3. The table precludes
calculating the percent for Britain separately. See also Khan (2005).
27Charlesworth (1983) presents rural protest in Britain from 1548 to 1900. Protests were particularly likely
when food prices were high. He notes that, in Lowland England, “by the second decade of the seventeenth
century ... lords were successful in ... sweeping away ... tenantry to make way for the large leasehold
farm ... through the poor law, the attack on alehouses, the quarter session and the church court” (pp.
16-18). Patriquin (2006) notes that "it is striking that a profound recasting of class relations in England,
one which left most people bereft of property and control over their lives, occurred without inducing a
protracted and violent revolution" (p. 223).
13disaster [of class warfare], but rather inequality. Now, the implementation of the lineage
system is designed to stimulate the basic human impetus to share foodstuﬀs on the basis
of seasonal need, and to foster the collective husbanding of resources to smooth over good
and bad years. [When the people adhere to this properly] there will be no need to rely
upon government action to care for the destitute, the orphaned, and the ill. When such
principles of sharing so as to eliminate poverty are observed, how can resources fail to be
adequate? It was for this reason above all that the ancient rulers instituted the lineage
system.” (Rowe 1998, p. 383).
Although the Chinese and English risk-sharing institutions emerged to fulﬁll the same
functions, they had diﬀerent forms due to distinct cultural and institutional elements.
Speciﬁcally, the English society did not have large, kin-based units implying that a lineage-
based institution was too costly, if not impossible, for the state to create. The state
turned to the pre-existing, self-governed parishes to provide poor relief. In China, however,
lineages prevailed and the state’s administration was designed to interact with large kin-
based social structures and not their individual members. Creating a state-based poor
relief system was too costly given the alternative of relying on lineages. Because their
growth implications were unforeseen, these risk-sharing institutions were not designed to
promote growth. It is therefore appropriate to consider the forms of these risk-sharing
institutions as exogenous while modeling their impact on growth.
3 The Model
We model the rate of productivity growth as a function of risk-sharing institutions. After
presenting the model’s basic structure, this section models the benchmark case of a market
economy and continues by considering two risk-sharing institutions. The ﬁrst is a state-
based institution which complements the market through redistribution to the poor. And
the second is a lineage-based institution under which economic agents are insured by their
lineages and they employ the technology chosen by their elders and share the output.
3.1 The Basics




each of whom is young for two periods and is old for the rest of her life. An agent
might die with probability 1-λ at the beginning of each period and an agent who dies is
immediately replaced.28 An agent is a ‘newly born’ in his ﬁrst period, a ‘young adult’ in
28Our analysis abstracts from fertility issues in order to demonstrate that things do not depend on time-
dependent variables and changes in relative prices. This implies, however, that we have to ignore fertility-
related facts. We agree that fertility issues are important, but our focus is on the eﬀects of risk sharing
institutions and we leave potential linkages between fertility and risk sharing for future work. Moreover,
14the second, and an ‘elder’ thereafter. Standard models let agents be young for only one
period. Yet, the relevant choice in our model is next period’s capital productivity, which
is driven by the next-period utility function. If agents were young for only one period, we
could not capture age-dependent risk preferences.29
Denote by uy the utility function of a young agent (either newly born or young adult),
by uo the utility function of an old agent and by β the discount factor. The utility functions
are deﬁned over income and are increasing, concave, (twice) continuously diﬀerentiable,
satisfying the Inada conditions and having decreasing relative risk aversion (DRRA).30
Only newly born agents can produce and each one is endowed with one indivisible unit
of labor which young agents can only use to operate their own plant. Production also
requires capital. The per-period production function of each newly born’s plant is:
y =( Ak)
α ,( 1 )
where A is capital productivity, k is capital units, Ak is the units of eﬀective capital and
α<1 is the capital share. At the end of her ﬁrst period, a newly born agent divides her
income between consumption and saving in the form of capital. Young adults and elderly
agents rent their capital, consume and save. Capital depreciates at rate δ per period.
A newly born is endowed with the previous period’s average capital productivity and
depreciated average capital level.31 This ‘inheritance’ creates inter-generational spillover
eﬀects in our fertility-free model.32
Each agent i can use one of two technologies that aﬀect her future idiosyncratic capital
productivity, Ai
t+1. These technologies diﬀer in their expected impact on future produc-
tivity of capital rather than current output. The ﬁrst technology is low-risk, low-return
capping population growth in this manner biases the analysis against our argument.
29Alternatively, we could have changed the timing of moves and let agents ﬁrst make their technological
choices, then have the productivity realizations and ﬁnally let agents produce. But this would have
implied that young agents had to make decisions before they were born.

































where S is the space of states of the world, sτ+t is the state of the world at time τ + t, π(sτ+t|sτ+t−1)
is the conditional Markovian probability, c
i,τ
τ+t is the consumption of agent i of generation τ in period








t=0 represents every possible consumption value for each state of the world
conditional on survival.
31The analysis is robust to reasonable alternative speciﬁcations such as one in which a newly-born individual’s
initial capital equals that of someone she replaces.
32An alternative speciﬁcation is that capital fully depreciates upon one’s death and there is no intergenera-
tional capital bequest. We simulated this model and our results remained qualitatively the same. This is
because δ is already so large that the eﬀect of the additional depreciation becomes of second order.
15(LR) and the second is high-risk, high-return (HR).
As noted above, this general speciﬁcation is aimed as capturing, in reduced form, the
complex relations between risk and reward in pursuing productivity-enhancing activities.
One interpretation of this speciﬁcation is that of a choice among known technologies that
are more or less risky. Another is that of experimenting outside the known technological
frontier. And yet another is making productivity-enhancing economic choices more gen-
erally. Instead of explicitly modeling each of these complex possibilities, we attempt to
capture their common denominator in a parsimonious manner.
All individuals – including the young adults and the old – decide in every period
whether or not to alter their technology in an attempt to upgrade their capital productivity.
Thus, when newly-born agents rent capital on the market, rented capital comes coupled
with a technology chosen by the owners of capital.
Formally, each technology j is deﬁned by its expected return (in terms of new knowl-





Productivity of agent i’s capital next period, Ai
t+1, depends on her current productivity,
Ai
t, the return on the technology she chooses, μj, and an individual-level idiosyncratic
shock, εi
t,j. Speciﬁcally, we assume that the logarithm of productivity follows a random
walk with drift as in
logAi
t+1 =l o gAi
t + μj + εi
t,j (3.a)









where j = LR,HR (3.b)
The main distinction between this set-up and the theoretical growth models on which
we build is regarding the rate of productivity growth. In the latter, productivity growth is
either exogenous, due to investment in acquiring existing knowledge rather then produc-
ing new knowledge, or depends positively on variables that are assumed to change over
time, such as population. However, here, productivity growth is endogenous reﬂecting
technologically feasible choices at the social and individual levels.
163.2 Risk-sharing: the Market, the State and the Lineage
The rest of this section considers the growth implications of diﬀerent risk-sharing in-
stitutions through their impact on risk-taking. Consistent with the historical records,
we assume that there is no insurance market and recognize that risk-sharing institutions
inﬂuence the allocation of both decision rights and income. Our speciﬁcation enables com-
paring an individualistic economy with or without state-based insurance with an economy
with a lineage-based insurance.33 In the individualist society, labor and capital are al-
located by market forces, each agent chooses a technology for her capital, and has no
insurance unless provided by the state. In the lineage-based society, labor and capital are
allocated within the lineage, elders choose a technology, and lineage members insure each
other.
3.2.1 Individualistic, Market Economy
Consider a small open economy with a ﬁxed, state independent rental rate of capital, r,
and recall that a newly born agent produces by combining her labor with capital.34 The





newly born agents have the same endowment, denote, for ease of exposition, the capital
productivity and capital of a newly born agent i born at time t by Ai
t and ki
t, respectively.





rents Atkt units on the market and otherwise rents her excess capital in the market. The























We can now turn to the inter-temporal problem of saving and technological choices.
Given the agent’s stock of capital and her productivity at the beginning of a period, she
chooses a technology and how much to save. Recall that the capital productivity of each
young adult and elder can diﬀer due to individual-speciﬁcp a s to u t c o m e s .F o rs i m p l i c i t y ,
however, we present the optimization problem of an agent i of cohort k at time t.D e n o t e
by Ji
k,t and ki
t+1 the technological and saving decisions, respectively, of agent i0s cohort
k = 1, 2, 3 (a newly born, young adult and elderly respectively) in period t (Note that
ki
t+1 equals her net capital plus saving at the end of period t.)D e n o t eb yV
i,
k,t the value
functions of such an agent. The dynamic programming problems are (using superscript
m to denote a market economy):
33Markets prevailed in pre-modern China, of course, but our focus is on the non-market relations among
members of lineages.












































































































Decreasing relative risk aversion implies that suﬃciently poor agents (those with low
Ai
tki
t) adopt the LR technology while suﬃciently wealthy agents adopt the HR technology.
If there are initially suﬃciently many poor agents, the average productivity of capital is
low enough to make the LR technology optimal for subsequent generations as well. If,
however, there are initially suﬃciently many wealthy agents who adopt the HR technology,
their choice has a positive inter-temporal spill-over eﬀect; it increases the initial capital
productivity of the newly born. This process of higher capital productivity reinforces itself
and eventually every agent employs the risky technology. Our model thereby captures that
technological choices have an external eﬀect on productivity growth and either LR or HR
technologies can perpetuate in equilibrium.35
The HR technology Pareto dominates the LR technology because shocks are agent
speciﬁc and there is no aggregate uncertainty.36 It is Pareto optimal for all agents to use
the HR technology and share the output, thereby gaining from its positive intertemporal
spillover eﬀects. Risk-sharing institutions can therefore determine whether an economy
remains in a LR technology equilibrium or exhibits a transition to HR technology equi-
librium. In our model, a society can remain trapped in a low-growth equilibrium in the
absence of an appropriate risk-sharing institution. If a risk-sharing institution is intro-
duced, however, a larger fraction of the agents adopt the HR technology and the increase
35Similarly, increasing returns to scale in the endogenous growth literature implies that higher income per
capita leads to higher productivity levels, which itself increases income per capita and reinforces growth
(e.g., Romer, 1986).
36For a proof, see Kocherlakota (1996) or Ligon, Tomas and Worral (2000). Since the endowment is state
invariant in the economy and there is perfect risk sharing, agents will have constant consumption across
states. Since total endowment is larger with the high-risk, high-return technology, agents will have a higher
state-invariant consumption with the latter technology.
18in wealth can reinforce the adoption of the risky technology, up to the point where all
agents utilize the HR technology.
3.2.2 State-based Insurance: the Old Poor Law
Regardless of the social institutions it involved – be it state- or clan-based – relief to the
poor could have distorted technological choices and the allocations of capital and labor
if it had to be ﬁnanced through taxes on the factors of production. The Old Poor Law,
however, was ﬁnanced by a tax on land. Taxing a ﬁxed factor acts as a quasi lump-sum
tax and it is therefore reasonable that distortions were relatively small. The evidence
conﬁrms that this was the case.37 Accordingly, we ignore the issue of ﬁnancing (and its
distortionary eﬀect) to more clearly capture the Poor Law’s impact on risk-taking rather
than wealth redistribution. Similarly, those who paid or administered the tax had neither
legal nor customary rights to inﬂuence others’ technological choices.
On this basis, we assume that the Poor Law reduced the variance of the individual-level
technological shocks as a means of mitigating appropriation risk.38 Speciﬁcally, denote
the standard deviation of the individual level idiosyncratic shock under the Poor Law by
σ2













The Poor Law reduces risk and therefore the capital productivity levels above which
agents adopt the risky technology. Formally, denote these thresholds of capital produc-






for the newly born and the rest of the
37Clark (2008) estimated that the Old Poor Law was not distortive. Personal and commercial wealth was not
taxed. To the extent that the Poor Law thereby led to an allocation of more resources toward commerce
and industry, it had an additional favorable impact on industrialization.
38We discuss the mechanism through which social insurance reduced appropriation risk in subsection 3.2.4
below. And we present an extension of our benchmark model that incorporates the adoption of social
insurance in response to the threat of appropriation in Appendix B.






















> 0, this modeling of the Poor Law implies both a change in the risk structure and
wealth. To keep the introduction of the Poor Law wealth neutral, we prefer modeling it as a reduction in
the volatility of the shocks.






after the Poor Law. The




o .39 See proof in Appendix A.
By reducing the threshold levels above which agents adopt the risky technology, the
Poor Law can initiate a transition that otherwise would not have taken hold. The sim-
ulation below lends support to the argument that the Old Poor Law had such impact.
Before turning to the simulation, however, we address the comparative question: couldn’t
an equivalent lineage-based insur a n c es y s t e mh a v eb e e ns i m i l a r l ye ﬀective in initiating a
transition? As it was practiced in China, we ﬁnd that the answer is ‘no’.
3.2.3 Social Insurance: The Lineage
The distinct assignment of decision rights were associated with the Chinese lineage-based
institution and the English Poor Law. Under lineage-based insurance, elders had more
decision rights over technological choices than they had under the English Poor Law. The
following extension of the model captures this notion.
A lineage, Γ,i saﬁnite group of agents of diﬀerent generations that merge their en-
dowments, share the output they produce and communally decide which technology to
use. Accordingly, we assume that the elders determine the technological choice and the
capital accumulation within each lineage. Formally, the evolution of the capital stock for
t h ea v e r a g el i n e a g ei skΓ
t+1 = kΓ







t is investment at
time t. Since each lineage has a ﬁnite number of agents, even initially identical lineages
will subsequently diﬀer in their per-period mortality and membership. We therefore model
the dynamics of an average lineage, whose demographics are identical to that of the pop-
ulation as a whole. The average lineage is composed of N
1−λ agents. For each newly born
agent, there are λ young adults and λ2
1−λ elderly agents implying an expected number of
N
1−λ agents.
Capital and labor are matched within the lineage and output is divided, without loss of
generality, equally among members. Each member obtains 1−λ
N of the total production. To
maintain comparability with the individualistic society and to capture insurance provided
by the lineage, we assume that the capital of each lineage’s member is still subject to
individual-level idiosyncratic shocks. The variance of the productivity shock that such a
lineage faces is N
1−λ times smaller than the variance of any given technology.40 Lineages
39It is suﬃcient to focus on the newly borns and the elders because the threshold for the young adult and
the elderly are the same. The choice of the technological regime impacts next period utility, with both the
current young adults and elder agents having the same preferences.















t. For sake of simplicity we assume






N units of eﬀective capital. Note that since the production
20provide insurance.
Insurance provided by the lineage, everything else being equal, makes a transition
more likely. Lineage-based insurance, similar to the Poor Law reduces risk and therefore
the capital productivity levels above which agents adopt the risky technology. Formally,






. Everything else being
equal, the lineage-based insurance might be as eﬀective in promoting risk taking as the
Poor Law.
But not everything was equal and, in the case of China, elders had more decision
rights than other members. Accordingly, we assume that the elders determine the choice
of technology and the capital accumulation within each lineage. Hence, only the problem
of the elders matters for the derivation of a clans optimal policies. The value functions
for the newly born and the young adults are determined by the elders’ investment choice
and there is full insurance – equal consumption, at least for each cohort – within the








































Since the elders are more risk averse than the young, the elders would choose, ceteris
paribus,t h eLR technology in situations in which the newly-born agents would be indif-
ferent between the HR and LR technologies. In particular, diﬀerent choices are likely
in ‘intermediate’ levels of capital productivity. (See Appendix A.) Two opposite forces
emerge in the lineage-based society. On the one hand, insurance within the lineage fosters
risk taking. On the other hand, the elders’ higher risk aversion discourages risk taking.
Which force would dominate and whether the lineage-based insurance promotes growth is
an empirical matter.
function is decreasing in units of eﬀective capital, dividing the units of eﬀective capital evenly across the
n e w l yb o r na g e n t si st h em o s te ﬃcient allocation (and bodes well for our analysis focusing on the average
lineage). Also note that the lineage’s variance is N/(1 − λ) times smaller than an individual shock only
if shocks are indpendent across lineage members and also if all members have the same units of eﬀective
capital. We will take the most comprehensive case of insurance in the lineage and then compare it to the
individualistic, market economy.
41All elders will make the same choice given that each considers the clan’s total eﬀective capital.
213.2.4 The Emergence of Social Insurance
While our main theme in this paper revolves around the diﬀerences between state-based
and clan-based social insurance systems in China and England, a more fundamental issue
involves why social insurance schemes came to be adopted in both countries in the ﬁrst
place.
The political economy literature has long emphasized the risk of extralegal appropria-
tion and the threat of violent conﬂict as important motives for redistributive policies that
were supported by the political and economic elite.42 Indeed, as we have alluded to in
subsection 2.3 above, there is some historical evidence that such concerns played a role in
the adoption of the Old Poor Law in England and the emergence of the clan-based social
insurance system in China.
In Appendix B, we present a simple extension of our model which illustrates the
potential role of appropriation risk in the advent of a state-based social insurance program.
In particular, we illustrate there that the risk of extralegal appropriation for the wealthy
individuals is highest in an economy with high income variance. While we chose not to
elaborate on this point further below, with slight modiﬁcations, the extension in Appendix
B could be embedded in our basic framework to motivate the rise of the clan-based system
in China as well.
4 Simulations
The absence of data prevents us from conducting an empirical analysis. In the context of
our model, however, we can use simulation analysis to ask the following questions:
1. Could the risk of appropriation have resulted in the emergence of social insurance
structures, such as the English Old Poor Law and Chinese clan-based networks?
2. Could diﬀerences in decision making rights inherent in these social structures have
aﬀected risk-taking in a quantitatively signiﬁcant way?
3. Could the resulting diﬀerences in risk-taking account for England’s transition and
China’s stagnation?
Our simulation suggests an aﬃrmative answer to all three questions.
The ﬁrst part of this section discusses our calibration strategy. To make the simulation
meaningful, we resort to historical evidence in choosing our parameters wherever possible.
42For some work on the links between production, appropriation and allocation of resources to conﬂict, see
Hirshleifer (1991), Grossman (1994) and Grossman and Iyigun (1995). For the role of class conﬂict on the
enactment of redistributive policies, refer to Grossman (1994) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2000).
22In the absence of such evidence, we set the parameters, when reasonable, to values that
are standard in the literature. We calibrate the remaining parameters to render the model
consistent with the observed long-run growth trajectory prior to the transition in England.
The calibrated model is then used in our simulation analyses. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁrst
simulate both economies with relatively constant levels of consumption per capita. This
captures the situation in China and England prior to 1600. A simulation then examines
the impact of an introduction of a state-based risk-sharing institution assuming that it
provides the same level of risk-sharing as clan-based insurance. This simulation thus
captures the impact of institutional forms and not functions, namely, the diﬀerence in
risk-taking entailed by the distinct decision rights that were inherent in these institutions.
We then evaluate whether the Poor Law could have tilted the balance of risk-taking to
initiate a transition. On that basis, we proceed to examine how much more insurance the
lineage system would have needed to spur a transition to sustained growth.
Finally, we investigate the role of income inequality on the adoption of a social in-
surance system – speciﬁcally, that of the Old Poor Law. Thus, for these last set of
simulations, we turn to the extended version of our model with appropriation risk, which
is in Appendix B.
4.1 Parameter Choices
This subsection presents some motivation for our choice of parameter values. The para-
meters relate to demographics, preferences, technologies and the exogenous rental price of
capital. Table 1 summarizes the parameters chosen for our baseline simulations.
4.1.1 Demographic Structure
Each period lasts for twenty years. Agents are referred to as newly born in the 0-19 cohort,
young adults in the 20-39 cohort and elderly for the rest of their lives. Agents die and
exit the model with a per-period probability, 1 − λ,o f0.5. T h i si sc o n s i s t e n tw i t ht h e
high rate of pre-modern mortality before adulthood and implies that an agent’s expected
working life is thirty years. Given that, as late as the early 19th century, life expectancy
at birth was about 40 years, this seems to be a sensible assumption.43 We assume that
young agents are born with the average productivity and the average capital level within
their respective societies.
43In early nineteenth century China (the Yangzi Delta), male life expectancy at 15 was between 30 to 54 years
(Liu, Cuirong, 1992 cited by Brenner and Isett, 2002). In our model, the probability of being older than
100 years is 3.125%. This is clearly unrealistic, but keeping an unconditional death probability simpliﬁes
the model and keeps the issue of fertility as silent as possible.
234.1.2 Preferences
As explained in detail in the previous section, our mechanism hinges on the agents’ de-
creasing appetite for risk at lower levels of wealth and old age. One way to ensure that
is with a utility function that exhibits DRRA and higher risk aversion for the elders. We
choose a standard CES utility function that is augmented by a minimum level of (sub-
sistence) consumption that varies by age. The risk aversion parameter, ω, is set to 5
w h i c hi sw i t h i nt h er a n g eo fr i s ka v e r s i o nc o e ﬃcients used in macroeconomics. We assume
Stone-Geary preferences with a higher minimum consumption for the old to endogenize
diﬀerences in risk preferences. Speciﬁcally, we use the following utility function where the













We assume that there is no minimum consumption requirement for the young, hence
cy =0 . The minimum consumption requirement for the elderly is set at a higher value
of co =0 .06. This speciﬁcation leads to a moderate diﬀerence in risk aversion between
the young and the old when the steady state consumption per capita is the same across
societies. (Namely, before the poor law is established.) In that steady state, the risk
aversion coeﬃcient for the young is 5 and only 11.3% higher for the elders, at 5.58.
As a side note, we have already stated in footnote 11 on page 4 that there could be
economic fundamentals behind individuals getting more risk averse in old age. In that
















As long as rβλ > 1, the optimal consumption path would be upward sloping, making
individuals relatively more risk averse with age.
In the simulations discussed below, we shall employ the speciﬁcation in (7), although
other simulations in which we use the utility in (8) yielded qualitatively similar results.
244.1.3 Technological Choices
As set in equation (3.a), the logarithm of A follows a random walk with drift. For each
technology, we thus have to calibrate the drift term as well as the variance of its innova-
tions. For the LR technology, the average growth rate is set to zero, μLR =0 ,t or e ﬂect
the absence of sustained growth before the Industrial Revolution. In the early stages of
the English Industrial Revolution (roughly from 1780 to 1820), the annual income per
capita growth rate increases to a value just below 0.5% (Maddison 1991). Accordingly, we
assume that the HR technology has a per-period return of μHR =1 0 .5% which implies a
0.5% return a year.
The innovations to A are assumed to be uncorrelated both across agents and time and
normally distributed with a mean of zero. The standard deviation of innovations for the
low-risk technology is set at a low value of 0.015. The standard deviation of innovations
for the HR technology is then set at a value of 0.19 which implies slightly more than a
tenfold increase. This value is chosen to reproduce the historical evidence of stagnant
growth in the baseline case and a take-oﬀ in England after the introduction of state-based
insurance through the Poor Law.
Under the system of clan based insurance in China, the standard deviation of innova-
tions can be directly linked to the size of the clan which determines the number of agents
who pool resources and thus partially insure each other. There is some historical evidence
on the size of a typical clan. While a stem family had, on average, ten members with
about six working adults (Liu, 1959, pp. 2-3), a clan could reach a size of more than 1000
adults. Fei and Liu (1982, p. 387) report a ‘critical maximum’ size of 1400 adults and
note that clans disintegrated beyond that size. Their eﬀectiveness in assisting their poor
members, most likely, declined long before reaching their maximum size for two reasons.
First, eﬀectiveness declined as members of the clan lived further away from each other.
Second, clans usually supported their needy members by using the income from a trust
set up for this purpose early in the clan’s history. As the clan grew in size, the support
per-pauper was likely to decline. In the same book, Fei and Liu report numbers for a typ-
ical clan with an average of 144 male adults.44 In the context of our model, this implies
ac l a ns i z eo f288 male members which yields a value of 144 for the parameter N which
denotes the number of newly born male members. Under our assumptions, the standard
deviation of shocks to the lineage is given by σCH = σN−0.5 (1 − λ)
0.5.45
Turning to the case of England, the Poor Law itself provides partial insurance against
44Of the clan’s 481 members, 60% were adults. Hence, we are left with 144 male adults.
45We have performed a comparative statics analysis where we increase the number of agents per lineage.
Not surprisingly, the more agents are present in the lineage, the more inclined the lineage is to engage in
the risky technology. This matches the anecdotal evidence of the Tong and Song dynasties, where lineages
were widely extended as well as economic prosperity.
25those shocks. This is captured by the parameter ϕPL that determines the standard de-
viation of innovations under the Poor Law as a share of the standard deviation in the
baseline case such that σPL = ϕPLσ. As we are lacking a strong empirical prior on how
to calibrate this parameter, we set it at a value that exactly equalizes the variance of
innovations in China to those in England under the Poor Law. In that sense, we calibrate
the model such that both methods of insurance alleviate the shocks agents are confronted
with by the same degree. To achieve this end, we set this parameter at 1/17.
The remaining parameters are chosen as follows: We set the annual discount factor to
0.975 which implies a discount factor in the model, β,o f0.603 per period. The capital share
α is 1/3 and the depreciation rate δ is set to 0.543,i m p l y i n ga3% annual depreciation.
Based on the historical interest rates reported in Homer and Sylla (1998), we set the
interest rate r to an annual value of 4.5% which yields a 141% return every twenty years.
4.2 Simulations
4.2.1 Setup of Simulation Experiment
The problem of the elderly can be solved as a standard inﬁnite horizon consumption-
saving problem that is extended by the endogenous choice of technology.46 Given the
value function of the elderly, we can solve the model backwards. The problem of the
young adults and newly born can both be solved in a single iteration where each cohort
uses the following cohort’s value function as a continuation value. This allows us to derive
optimal policies for all age groups. In the case of China, the problem is even easier and
reduces to solving the problem of the elderly as they are the ones making decisions for the
whole clan.
With the optimal policies at hand, we can simulate an economy inhabited by a large
number of agents.47 As outlined above, every agent who dies is replaced by a newly
born agent who enters the model with the average capital stock and productivity as the
surviving agents in the economy or the clan, respectively. The initial capital stock and
productivity values are chosen to prevent Ai
t from becoming negative. This economy is
simulated for a large number of periods until it reaches its stationary distribution.
We then model the exogenous introduction of the Poor Law as a reduction in the
46We use value-function iteration on a grid for capital and productivity. The process for productivity is
approximated as a ﬁnite state Markov process using a variant of the approximation method developed
by Tauchen (1986) and Tauchen and Hussey (1991). We use a very wide grid to prevent artiﬁcial mean
reversion at the bounds of the grid. In additon, we approximate the value function outside the grid for
productivity using a spline approximation.
47As we close the model with an exogenously assumed interest rate, the number of agents in each generation
does not aﬀect the results other than to provide smoothing across simulations. The graphs depicted in
this paper come from a simulation that uses 10,000 agents.
26variance of innovations to the productivity process. In terms of the simulation, this is
achieved by simply using the appropriate policy functions and transition matrix.48
Finally, as in Appendix B, we incorporate appropriation into our model in order to
simulate the endogenous adoption of the Old Poor Law in England.
4.2.2 Simulation Results
In every period, agents choose between the LR and HR technologies. The optimal choices
can be represented graphically as shaded areas in the (A,k)-space. Figures 1 and 2, for
instance, show the combinations of productivity and capital for which the elderly and
the newly born choose the diﬀerent technologies, respectively. The shaded area at the
lower left represents the adoption of the LR technology while the white area denotes the
adoption of the HR technology. The ﬁgures illustrate that agents with a relatively low
capital stock and a low level of productivity are less likely to choose the HR technology
despite its higher expected growth rate. Moreover, when comparing Figures 1 and 2, it
becomes clear that the elderly are less willing to take risks. This is simply a result of their
larger risk aversion implied by the preference speciﬁcation.
The introduction of the Poor Law reduces the dispersion of shocks under both tech-
nological choices. Figures 3 and 4 illustrate that both the elderly and the newly born
are willing to take more risks – the shaded area of LR choices is much smaller and only
applies for very low levels of capital and productivity.
In the lineage society, decisions are made by the elderly alone. Figure 5 depicts their
choices, again in the (A,k)-space. While the partial insurance within the clan yields
signiﬁcantly larger risk taking than in the market society, the eﬀect is not as strong as
under the Poor Law.
The time-series simulation supports the conjecture that risk-sharing institutions played
a pivotal role in England’s transition and China’s relative lack of economic growth. Be-
fore the introduction of the Poor Law, there is no risk sharing in the market economy.
Consequently, agents opt for the low-risk technology and the economy is literally stag-
nant. When the Poor Law is introduced, the thresholds to engage in riskier activities fall
and there is an instantaneous spike in the fraction of the population that chooses the HR
technology as the beneﬁt of a higher expected growth rate is no longer oﬀset by the larger
dispersion of shocks. This generates income per capita growth that fosters further risk
taking. A transition transpires until every agent uses the HR technology.
48Alternatively, one could assume that the Poor Law is introduced gradually. There is evidence that the
insurance provided by the Poor Law reached diﬀerent parishes at diﬀerent times reaching all of England
only around 1700. In terms of our model, the only diﬀerence would be a smoother transition to the growth
path.
27This process can be observed in Figure 6 which plots the share of agents in the market
society that employ the HR technology. After the Poor Law introduction, this share
jumps up to just below 50% before increasing slowly toward full adoption. In the lineage
economy, by contrast, risk-sharing within the clan motivates some of the relatively more
risk-averse elders to chose the HR technology, but their number is too low to initiate a
sustained transition. Hence, there is no major shift toward using the HR technology.
The transition to a dynamic growing economy after the Poor Law introduction can be
studied further in Figures 7 through 10. Average productivity growth takes oﬀ after the
adoption of the Poor Law as more and more agents choose the HR technology. Investment,
however, drops at ﬁrst as there is less need to insure against bad realizations of productivity
growth. This is depicted in Figure 8. As productivity reaches higher and higher levels,
however, investment picks up too. Figure 9 illustrates the resulting development of the
capital stock and Figure 10 plots consumption which increases immediately following the
Poor Law’s introduction.
These results remain wholly intact when we extend our baseline model to incorpo-
rate appropriation risk and the commensurate endogenous adoption of a social insurance
system. For heuristic purposes, consider the English case where, according to our frame-
work, historical dynamics dictated the adoption of state-based social insurance when such
a system was socially or politically desirable.
F i r s t ,t a k et h ec a s ei nw h i c ht h eO l dP o o rL a wi sn o ti ne ﬀect, and some individuals can
engage in extralegal means to appropriate others’ resources. Figures 11 and 12 draw the
analogs of Figures 1 and 2 when there is some degree of appropriation in the economy. Both
among the young and the old, we see that those with the least amount of eﬃciency units
of capital engage in appropriation. However, there are relatively more young than old who
engage in appropriation (instead of production) because the young have fewer resources,
which lowers their appropriation opportunity cost. The next two ﬁgures replicate 11
and 12 with the exception that the appropriation productivity parameter, B,i sn o ws e t
at a higher level. As shown, and not too surprisingly, when B i ss e ta t6i n s t e a do f
.1, more young and old individuals engage in appropriation. As a result, the threshold
combinations of capital and technology for the adoption of the high-risk technology rises.
Hence, appropriation creates both direct and indirect adverse eﬀects on the economy: not
only does it take more capital and technology to decide to engage in productive activities,
but it takes even more to adopt the high-risk technology when some resources could be
lost to extralegal appropriation.
In Figures 15 and 16, we depict what happens with the Old Poor Law in eﬀect and
the appropriation technology parameter, B, set at its upper bound of 6.49 As shown, the
49As we shall discuss subsequently, it is socially optimal to adopt the Old Poor Law if B exceeds 1.5 and
28Old Poor Law not only eliminates appropriation, but also encourages more individuals to
adopt the high-risk technology, both among the old and the young.
Of course, the adoption of a social insurance scheme based on income transfers has costs
to society. Thus, its social net beneﬁt depends on the degree of income inequality in the
economy and the eﬀectiveness of extra-legal appropriation. In our ﬁnal set of simulations,
we investigated the combinations of parameter values and state variables that socially and
dynamically justiﬁed the adoption of social insurance.
Figure 17 reports the outcome of one such exercise in which the degree of income
inequality is relatively low. In the ﬁgure, we plot average social welfare as a function
of the parameter of technology of appropriation, B, and with all other parameters set
according to Table 1. As shown, when no social insurance program exists, social welfare
declines as the return to appropriation rises with increases in B.W i t ht h eO l dP o o rL a w
in eﬀect, there is no appropriation and average welfare remains independent of B, although
t h ea m o u n to fi n c o m et r a n s f e r sf r o mt h er i c ht ot h ep o o rr i s e sw i t hB.M o s ti m p o r t a n t l y ,
h o w e v e r ,i st h ef a c tt h a tB needs to be suﬃciently high (i.e., in excess of 1.6 or 15 out
of 50 in our grid scale) for the Old Poor Law to be socially optimal. And, although not
shown, higher income inequality would also make it more likely that the Old Poor Law is
adopted, even when B is below the threshold shown, which is 1.6.
5 Supporting Historical Observations
The comparative technological history of China and England is puzzling. China was
ahead of England around 1000 CE but subsequently fell behind. During the Song dynasty
(960-1279 CE), China was the world’s technological leader. It “developed an amazing
technological momentum, and moved, as far as these matters can be measured, at a rate as
fast as or faster than Europe” (Mokyr 1990, p. 208). Yet, shortly after the fall of the Song,
technological development slowed and China became, relatively speaking, technologically
stagnant (ibid, p. 219). England became the leader. This reversal of fortune is inconsistent
with existing endogenous growth models. Our conjecture is consistent with both.
First, consider China. We argue that two factors determined the impact of its lineage-
based institutions on growth. Intra-lineage insurance encouraged risk-taking while control
by the risk-averse elders discouraged risk-taking. This implies more (less) technological
progress when lineages provides more (less) insurance, when elders are less (more) pow-
erful, and when there is no state-provided insurance. Consistent with these predictions,
there was more insurance and innovations in China early on when communal families (in
which output was equally shared) predominated. The clans that prevailed during subse-
income inequality is relatively high.
29quent dynasties only provided poor relief and thus less insurance (subsection 2.3). Elders
also had less legal authority during the Song dynasty than later. Under the Song, a parent
who killed an unﬁlial son was subject to less punishment compared to other murders. As
severe as this law may seem, it was mild compared to the law in later dynasties under
w h i c hi tw a sn o tac r i m ef o raf a t h e rt ok i l la nu n ﬁlial son! (Hamilton, 1990, p. 86).
Clearly, disobeying one’s father in post-Song China was a dangerous proposition.
Finally, the Song was the only post-1000 CE dynasty to have had a substantial state-
based, risk-sharing institutions. Wang Anshi, a prominent Song minister and reformer,
asserted that the state was responsible for providing the poor. Under his direction, the
state instituted pensions for the needy. (Ebrey, Walthall, and Palais, 2005). Later dynas-
ties did not follow this example although, because clans were mainly rural, poor relief was
s o m e t i m e sp r o v i d e di nc i t i e s .
Prior to the seventeenth century, England was less innovative than China. Our analy-
sis suggests the importance of China’s eﬀective risk-sharing institutions in causing this
outcome. Following the introduction of the Poor Law in England during the seventeenth
century, however, the intellectual and organizational basis of England’s industrial revolu-
tion was formed (Mokyr, 2005). There was, in particular, a rise in the distribution and
creation of new agricultural knowledge as measured by patents and technical manuals.
Between 1550 and 1600, the number of patents was zero and the number of published
farming technical manuals was 16. In the next 50 years the numbers increased to 28 and
43 respectively (Sullivan, 1984, Table 1).50 England’s economic ascendancy had began in
the seventeenth century (Nef, 1940; Clark, 2005). While real wage declined in the six-
teenth century, they increased after 1601 and, by the 1740s wages were 67 percent higher
than would have been predicted by the pre-1600 relations between population and real
wages.51
If the Poor Law reduced risks, areas with better poor relief should have had higher
rates of innovation and growth. Although in principle this is a testable proposition, un-
observable variations over time and space preclude doing so. These variations includes
parish-level politics, the endogenous level of poor reliefs expenditures, local and weather
related economic conditions, the sequentiality and randomness of innovations, the em-
ployment implications of diﬀerent innovations (e.g., drainage, economies of scale, new
agricultural products and techniques, turnpike, and enclosure), and negative or positive
inter-parish externalities.52 A positive correlation between poor relief and growth is sug-
50Sullivan conjectured that the increase reﬂects population growth. The rate of population growth, however
was much lower.
51Allen (2001); Clark (2005).
52Boyer 1986, for example, found that, in the early 19th century, the higher per-capita expenditures on poor
relief in the agricultural counties, compared to industrial ones, reﬂected diﬀerences in the local political
power of labor-hiring farmers.
30gested, however, by a survey conducted by the Board of Trade in 1696. The survey reveals
a "heavy expenditure [on poor relief], relative to population, in towns and industrial areas,
suggesting that they had been ﬁrst in the ﬁeld" (Slack, 1990, p. 18).
Another puzzling observation is that during the Industrial Revolution, England did
not stand out as particularly inventive. It was particularly good at adopting, adapting,
and commercializing inventions made elsewhere.53 France, in contrast, was a particularly
important source of inventions (Mokyr, 1990). This observation is consistent with our
conjecture. England’s risk-sharing institutions did not speciﬁcally reward inventors and
its patent system was not particularly rewarding either (e.g., Khan, 2008). The Poor
Law encouraged risk-taking in commercializing inventions by securing local landlords and
industrialists from the social unrest that their innovative activities might have otherwise
caused. France, which did not have a patent system during that period, was nevertheless
inventive because inventors were rewarded by the Crown (Kremer, 1998). France’s Poor
Law system, however, was not as eﬀective as England’s (e.g., Solar, 1995, p. 7; Lindert,
2004, p. 8) and innovations did not follow inventions.
Despite the diﬀerences in poor relief between England and the continent, the European
states were in a better position to imitate England than China. They did not have lineages,
elders had less power, and some state-based poor relief existed. As our analysis predicts,
Europe’s transition to the modern economy quickly followed England’s, while China did
not. Notably, the continental industrialization transpired in the context of creating the
modern, state-based welfare system. (Lindert, 2004). At this point in the process of the
rise of the modern economies, formal education became more important as a source of
productivity growth (Easterlin, 1981).
6C o n c l u s i o n
In existing growth-theoretic models, the initial increase in the rate of productivity growth
that causes transitions to a modern economy are due to either favorable realizations of
random economic variables or a technological drift. This paper presents how institutional
changes can initiate a transition by causing an endogenous technological drift. Analyt-
ically, our model considers the impact of distinct forms of risk-sharing institutions on
risk-taking, new useful knowledge, and rates of technological change.
Historically, the paper focuses on risk-sharing institutions in pre-modern China and
England. In both societies, such institutions were introduced for similar moral and po-
litical reasons. The forms of these institutions, however, were determined by pre-existing
53Mokyr (1990, 2002) highlights the importance of complementary factors such as an advanced machine tool
industry. These, however, also reﬂect the growth in useful knowledge.
31cultural, social, and institutional features. Clans were a central component of China’s
social and cultural fabric and provided the state with such services as taxation and adju-
dication. It was optimal for the state to rely on clans also to provide social safety nets. The
resulting clan-based, risk-sharing institutions contributed to the inﬂuence of the elders on
economic decisions. The stronger inﬂuence of the relatively more risk-averse elders had a
negative eﬀect on risk-taking, new knowledge, and growth. Societies in which risk-sharing
was provided by elder-dominated kinship groups were less likely to experience a transition
to a modern economy.54
In England, during the same time, there were no large kinship groups and individu-
alism prevailed. Non-kin based organizations, such as parishes provided the state with
administrative services. It was optimal for the state to rely on parishes to provide in-
surance as made explicit in the Old Poor law of 1601. This risk-sharing institution did
not shift decision power to the relatively more-risk averse elders. The Poor Law had the
unintended consequence of fostering risk-taking, new useful knowledge, higher rate of pro-
ductivity growth and the transition to the modern economy. It better insured the young
thereby motivating risk-taking. Better insurance to the poor reduced the risk from social
unrest that the wealthy faced when implementing new knowledge.55
The unintended consequences of the distinct forms of risk-sharing institutions in China
and England suggests “why was England ﬁrst” and why Europe, being culturally and
socially similar to England, was second. Ironically, Europe’s success seems not to have
been due to foresight but an unintended consequence of its peculiar institutions. Our
analysis supports the view that institutional distinctions – in functions and forms –
were central, rather than epiphenomenal, to transition to modern economies.
Transitions’ institutional conditionality is a contested issue in economic history and
growth theory. Economic historians have traditionally emphasized England’s growth-
enhancing institutions, such as limited government, better labor markets, and a social
environment conducive to innovations (e.g., North and Weingast, 1989; Mokyr, 1990, 1999,
2007; and Solar, 1995). More recent literature, however, has down-played institutions’ role,
claiming that intra- and inter-European institutional distinctions were insigniﬁcant on the
eve of the Industrial Revolution (e.g., Craft 1977; Pomeranz, 2000; Clark, 2005).
Growth theory has similarly downplayed the importance of institutional distinctions
54Risk-sharing institutions might still be relevant in determining the rate of productivity growth. In contem-
porary Africa, for example, parents do not adopt Pareto-improving technologies that would have reduced
their control over their children and hence the likelihood of old-age support (e.g., Hoﬀ and Sen, 2005).
55The positive mortality and real wage trends ended one hundred and ﬁfty years after the Old Poor Law was
enacted. Real wages, for example, declined during the second half of the 18th century and rose again only
in the 19th. The real world, unlike our model, exhibited urbanization, population growth, the Napoleonic
wars, and industrialization that changed workers’ bargaining power. See Crafts (1985); Steckel and Floud
(1997); Weir (1997); Cinnirella (2008).
32and emphasized the importance of accidents in determining the historical sequence of tran-
sitions. The “Industrial Revolution transpired due to an exogenous increase in research
productivity” (Kremer, 1990, p. 706). Institutions have been considered to impact, at
most, the sequence of transitions but not the process leading to them. “Policy and in-
stitutions, by discouraging or preventing the invention and adoption of new ideas, might
play an important role in determining when” industrialization transpires and “the fact
that the industrial revolution happened ﬁrst in England, ... rather than ... China ... is
perhaps due to the institutions and policies in place in these two countries” (Hansen and
Prescott, 2002, p. 1215; and see Galor, 2005, p. 178).
Our analysis suggests that institutions play a larger role in transitions determining
whether or not transitions will transpire by inﬂuencing risk taking, technological develop-
ment, and thus the rate of productivity growth. More generally, this paper reaﬃrms that
it is possible and rewarding to build on the pioneering recent works in growth theory to
better capture the complexity and diversity of growth processes. The functions and forms
of non-market institutions, and the political, social and cultural factors that inﬂuence
institutional selection matter. Incorporating institutions into uniﬁed growth theory has
the promise of enhancing our understanding of the "change in human condition that the
industrial revolution represents" (Lucas, 2002, p. 110).
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51Appendix A: The Productivity Level and Optimal Technol-
ogy
Remark 1 For every state of the world and social arrangement ( r = m,PL,or Γ) there






such that if At <A r
y, LR technology is optimal






, the HR (LR) is optimal for the newly born (young adult
and older agents); and if At >A r
o, HR technology is optimal for all agents.
Proof. The preferences depend on the comparison between the two technological
regimes, that can be viewed as two lotteries. The decision of the newly-born agents
depends on:
sign EAt+1|AtV r
2 (At+1,k t+1| (At,k t),H R ) − EAt+1|AtV r
2 (At+1,k t+1| (At,k t),L R )
for r = m,PL,o rΓ
The young adult and the older agents always have the same optimal technology. The
choice of technology impacts on next period utility, where both types of agents will have
the same (elderly type) preferences. Their decision depends on:
sign EAt+1|AtV r
3 (At+1,k t+1| (At,k t),H R ) − EAt+1|AtV r
3 (At+1,k t+1| (At,k t),L R )
for r = m,PL or Γ
S i n c ea l lt h ea g e n t sh a v eD R R Au t i l i t yfunctions, given the state variables






, such that for any value below
that threshold agents choose the low-risk regime and for any value above that threshold
they choose the high-risk regime in each of the social structure organizations. Since el-
derly agents are more risk averse than young agents Ar
y <A r
o. This determines three
zones. Given (At,k t),i fAt <A r
y, there is unanimity and all the agents favor the low






newly born favor the high-return regime while
the rest of the agents the low-return regime. If At >A r
o, all the preferences are realigned
again and everybody favors the high-return regime.
Appendix B: Appropriation Risk and Social Risk-Sharing
Suppose that all individuals can allocate their eﬃciency units of capital to either extralegal
appropriation or production. Further, assume that only a fraction ρ of the population
can organize to engage in extralegal appropriation which also requires the use of capital.56
56Since collective action is required to ﬁrst appropriate and then share the appropriated proﬁts or income,
there are inherent free-rider problems associated with extralegal appropration (see, for example, Grossman,
52Individuals who partake in extralegal appropriation target the rest of the population, 1−ρ,
and appropriation only covers the contemporaneous return to capital or proﬁts. In other
words, we assume that capital ownership is secure and cannot be appropriated, while the
income streams generated from capital are up for grabs in every period.
In every period t, individuals decide whether or not to engage in production versus
appropriation. And in doing so, they consider their return from extralegal appropriation
net of its opportunity cost. For each individual i, the latter is deﬁned by their forgone
earnings from production at time t. For newly-born individuals, i =1 ,t h i se q u a l st h e i r












t. For young adults






t+1 − (1 − δ)ki
t
¢
. Thus, the opportunity cost of extralegal means
would be lowest for those who possess low incomes – either because their stock of capital
is low, or their adopted technology is inferior, or both. Accordingly, ceteris paribus,t h e
poorest ρ fraction of society would engage in extralegal means.
Following standard convention, we employ a contest success function in order to deter-
mine the gross return from extralegal activities. Hence, letting B represent the technology





t denote the total amount of resources ρ fraction of indi-




.( B . 1 )
Equation (B.1) can be interpreted in one of two ways: either, it represents the fraction
of the targeted income that are eventually appropriated by those who engage in extralegal
appropriation, or it is the probability that the targeted income is fully captured by those
who pursue extralegal appropriation. According to the former interpretation, those who
engage in production lose Γt fraction of their income to extralegal activities and salvage
1−Γt fraction of their income. With the second interpretation, those who are specialized
in production avoid losing any of their income with 1−Γt probability. In either case, the
success of appropriative activities is increasing in the total amount of resources devoted
to it, bt, and in the technology of appropriation, B. In deciding their mode of economic
action, note that each individual i takes bt a sg i v e n ,w h i c hi nt u r nm a k e sΓt given.
Due to (B.1), it is clear that those who engage in appropriation would target the
wealthiest members of the economy.57 Hence, letting Gt denote the cumulative distribution
function of the eﬃciency units of capital in the economy at time t,w eh a v e
1994). We think of the fraction ρ as constituting a small enough group that could overcome such free-riding.
57The contest success function we employ here is most parsimonious in that it excludes reasonable other
factors, such as resources that the ‘target’ could devote to defend their property or wealth and the tech-
nology of defense. With more complicated but realistic contest success functions, it is possible that, under
some parameter values, the wealthiest individuals wouldn’t be targeted by those who choose to devote




t(x)dx =1 − ρ (B.2.a)




t(x)dx = ρ ,( B . 2 . b )
which deﬁnes the fraction of population at the bottom end of the wealth distribution
who specialize in extralegal appropriation instead of production. In (B.2.a) and (B.2.b),
g Atkt is jointly deﬁned by Gt(.) and ρ so that, if all individuals with eﬃciency capital
endowments of g Atkt and more are targeted, then 1− ρ fraction of the economy is subject
to appropriation risk.
Using (B.1), (B.2.a) and (B.2.b), and assuming that the captured proﬁts are shared
equally among those who pursue extralegal means, the net return to extralegal appropri-
































































With these modiﬁcations at hand, individuals’ dynamic problem presented in equations
(4.a) through (4.c) would, in every period t, involve a third decision (in addition to those
of technology and saving): to choose between production and appropriation.
Ceteris paribus, equations (B.3.a) and (B.3.b) are more likely to be positive for the
bottom ρ fraction of individuals in more unequal economies (those with higher σ2
j’s) and
with suﬃciently eﬀective technologies of appropriation (i.e., those with high B’s). In
54economies with inherently higher income risk, inequality is higher. In such economies, not




t(x)dx, is relatively larger, but also the
opportunity cost of appropriation – the terms in square brackets in (B.3.a) and (B.3.b)
– is relatively lower for more people at the lower end of the capital distribution. And
when (B.3.a) and (B.3.b) are satisﬁed for the poorest ρ fraction of a population, only 1−ρ
fraction of the economy is engaged in productive activities and all of the latter are subject
to appropriative risk.
T h e r ea r et h r e ep o s s i b l ee q u i l i b r i u mo u t c omes in such economies. First, there is an
appropriation equilibrium which we just described, with the poorest ρ fraction of the
economy pursuing extralegal, appropriative means and the 1 − ρ fraction engaged in pro-
duction. In such an equilibrium, there is always some appropriation and all producers face
a positive risk of appropriation every period.
In addition, there are two other equilibria, both of which require some coordination
among the rich: In the risk-sharing equilibrium, the producers (or the rich) coordinate
to tax themselves and use the proceeds for transfers to the poorest ρ fraction of the
society. In such an equilibrium, the per-person amount of transfers to the poor are such
that (B.3.a) and (B.3.b) are non-positive for all of the poorest ρ fraction of individuals.
Accordingly, there is no appropriation here with the rich choosing to experiment with
high-risk technologies.58
But, in an attempt to limit appropriation risk, the rich could also coordinate among
themselves to suppress experimentation with high-risk technologies. In this case, which
we label as the appropriation-cum-stagnation equilibrium, there is no tax-and-transfer
scheme. Instead, income growth and risk among the rich as well as wealth inequality in
society is limited because coordination among the rich ensures that they all employ the
low-risk and low-return technology. This, in turn, lowers the gross return from extralegal
appropriation – given by the ﬁr s tt e r m so ft h ee q u a t i o n si n( B . 3 . a )a n d( B . 3 . b )–a n d
serves to reduce appropriation incentives among the poor.59
Together with the capital distribution and the technology of appropriation given in
(B.1), the costs of coordination would determine which of the three equilibria would hold.
58According to (B.3.a) and (B.3.b), the transfer amount that would dissuade each individual from choosing
appropriation is individual speciﬁc, depending on the wealth of each individual. Thus, if transfers cannot
be individual speciﬁc, then an identical amount of transfer to all poor individuals would suﬃce to eliminate
appropriation risk, as long as the transfer amount is determined by (B.3.a) and (B.3.b) evaluated for the
wealthiest among the ρ fraction of the economy.
59One other possibility is that the rich coordinate to fend oﬀ extralegal appropriation by investing in defensive
activities. The simple appropriation technology we consider here in (B.1) leaves no room for such choice.
Nevertheless, more generally, it is resources invested in appropriation versus those invested against it that
decides the contest success function shown in (B.1). Then, there could be another equilibrium in which
the rich tax themselves and devote resources to defend against extralegal appropriation. For a model of
extralegal appropriation and production with oﬀensive as well as defensive fortiﬁcations, see Grossman
and Kim (1995). For a relevant discussion, also peruse Bates, Greif and Singh (2002).
55If the appropriation risk is relatively high (because the incomes of the poor are low rela-
tive to the wealthy) and the technology of appropriation is potent (such that B in (B.1)
is fairly large), but coordination among the rich is not prohibitively costly, then either the
risk-sharing or the appropriation-cum-stagnation equilibrium would emerge. Furthermore,
even if the coordination costs of the two latter equilibria are similar, the risk-sharing equi-
librium is dynamically eﬃcient, whereas the appropriation-cum-stagnation equilibrium is
not. Hence, as long as the coordination costs of the risk-sharing equilibrium are not much
higher than the appropriation-cum-stagnation equilibrium, the former is more likely to
emerge as the equilibrium.
While this exposition is agnostic in terms of the speciﬁc social arrangements that
could emerge in a risk-sharing equilibrium, the cultural and institutional constraints we
discussed in the body of our main paper presumably dictated the speciﬁcs o c i a lf o r mo ft h e
risk-sharing arrangements that emerged in equilibrium (i.e., kin-based versus non-kinship
risk-sharing).
56